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NOTE
Evidence--State v. Wade-Expert Testimony and the Dual
Reliability Test
The North Carolina Supreme Court has handed down a confusing
and often contradictory series of decisions over the last sixty years on
the admissibility of expert testimony based in whole or in part on hear-
say.' The traditional North Carolina rule provided two avenues
through which expert testimony could be presented to the jury: an ex-
pert could testify to, and base an opinion on, facts within his personal
knowledge or observation, or could answer a hypothetical question in-
corporating relevant facts that had already been entered into evidence.2
In the recent case of State v. Wade,3 however, the supreme court held
that an expert may base his opinion in whole or in part on reliable
hearsay and present the otherwise inadmissible foundation to the jury.4
Unfortunately, while Wade does represent a departure from older case
authority, it falls short of obtaining its ostensible objectives5 of recon-
ciling the inconsistencies of past cases and of formulating a universally
applicable rule on the admissibility of expert opinion testimony.
Defendant Wade confessed to the killing of his wife and two chil-
dren and was subsequently indicted for first degree murder. In an at-
tempt to prove defendant's insanity, defense counsel called a
psychiatric expert to give his opinion on whether defendant could dis-
tinguish between right and wrong at the time he committed the crime.6
The psychiatrist first testified that he had seen defendant on three occa-
sions after the crime for a total of three hours and had conducted a
standard psychiatric examination to determine defendant's mental con-
1. See text accompanying notes 27-78 infra.
2. State v. David, 222 N.C. 242, 22 S.E.2d 633 (1942).
There are two avenues through which expert opinion evidence may be presented to
the jury: (a) through testimony of the witness based on his personal knowledge or obser-
vation; and (b) through testimony of the witness based on a hypothetical question ad-
dressed to him, in which the pertinent facts are assumed to be true, or rather, assumed to
be so found by the jury.
Id. at 254, 22 S.E.2d at 640. See I D. STANSBuRY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 136, at 445
(Brandis rev. 1973).
3. 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
4. Id. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
5. See id.
6. Id at 456, 251 S.E.2d at 408.
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dition.7 Defense counsel then asked the psychiatrist what defendant
had said during the examinations concerning his state of mind at the
time of the crime.8 The trial court sustained the prosecution's objection
that the question called for hearsay testimony but allowed the expert to
read his answer into the record on voir dire.9 There, the doctor de-
scribed the five stage diagnostic process he used as well as defendant's
responses, and then gave his diagnosis that defendant was paranoid
and psychotic, suffering from delusions, hallucinations and persecution
complexes.10 At the conclusion of the voir dire testimony, the psychia-
trist gave his opinion that defendant did not know the difference be-
tween right and wrong at the time he committed the crime."I
When the jury returned, defense counsel attempted to introduce
the psychiatrist's opinion on the ultimate issue of insanity. The court
finally admitted the expert's opinion but did not allow him to tell the
jury that the opinion was based in part on defendant's out-of-court
statements.' 2 Defendant was subsequently convicted of second degree
murder. 13
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court found error in the
trial court's exclusion of the psychiatrist's testimony on the basis for his
opinion.' 4 The two major issues presented in the appeal were whether
an expert psychiatric opinion based in part on hearsay should be ad-
mitted, and if so whether the foundation for such an opinion should be
admitted. 5 Justice Exum, writing for the court, held' 6 that if the hear-
say foundation for an opinion is reliable then an expert can testify to
the opinion as well as to the facts and data he relied on in forming it.'
7
In allowing an expert to base an opinion in part on hearsay state-
7. Record at 34.
8. Id. at 35.
9. Id. at 37-43.
10. Id. at 36.
11. Id. at 42.
12. Id. at 44-54.
13. Id. at 69-70.
14. 296 N.C. at 455-56, 251 S.E.2d at 408.
15. Id. at 459, 251 S.E.2d at 410.
16. The court also held that evidence of a history of mental illness in defendant's family is
admissible only upon a showing that "(1) there is independent evidence of insanity on the part of
the person, (2) the same type of mental disorder is involved, and (3) the mental disorder is heredi-
tary in character." Id. at 464, 251 S.E.2d at 413.
17. d at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412. The decision rests on earlier cases which are said to support
the following two propositions:
(1) A physician, as an expert witness, may give his opinion, including a dianosis, based
either on personal knowledge or observation or on information supplied him by others,
including the patient, if such information is inherently reliable even though it is not
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ments the court recognized the validity of the expert's "expertise".1 8
The court found that the dangers in presenting out-of-court statements
to jurors are minimized when a witness has been specially trained to
interpret such statements for a particular use. 9 In addition, by al-
lowing an expert to base an opinion on facts and data compiled by
other experts, the court recognized that the increasing specialization in
modem medicine necessitates reliance on information prepared by
others.20
Despite its deference to the witness' expertise, the court retained
some judicial control by requiring that the hearsay foundation for an
opinion be inherently reliable. 2' The process by which an expert is de-
termined to be qualified creates a presumption of reliability when the
expert bases an opinion on facts or data derived by practices normally
used in his profession. 22 Nonetheless, a second indication of reliabil-
ity23 must be gleaned from the circumstances under which the out-of-
court statements were made before they will be admitted.
independently admissible into evidence. The opinion, of course, may be based on infor-
mation gained in both ways.
(2) If his opinion is admissible the expert may testify to the information he relied on in
forming it for the purpose of showing the basis of the opinion.
Id.
18. The witness "was duly qualified as an expert in the field of psychiatry." Id. at 456, 251
S.E.2d at 408.
19. Id. at 463, 251 S.E.2d at 412. The court noted that defendant was sent to the expert
witness as a patient for treatment. Id. The record suggests that this may not be entirely accurate.
Defendant was examined on three separate occasions, once in jail for 45 minutes, and twice while
in custody at a mental health clinic, for a total of three hours contact. Record at 34. These exami-
nations were conducted outside of normal therapeutic environments, and the second examination
was made at the request of defense counsel. Id. at 39.
The bonafide patient-physician relationship with an expectation of treatment and cure is
assumed to lend reliability to statements made by a defendant to a doctor. This, along with the
nature of the entire examination, which was described as a "carefully designed attempt to gain an
understanding of defendant's state of mind," were sufficient, according to the court, to insure
reliability. 296 N.C. at 463, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
20. 296 N.C. at 461-62, 251 S.E.2d at 411 (citing Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 779-
80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965)). Note, however, that there was no evidence that the
testifying psychiatrist in Wade had relied on information supplied by other experts.
21. Id. at 462, 251 S.E.2 at 412. The standards to determine what is inherently reliable must
be culled from earlier cases. See authorities cited in notes 27-77 and 80 supra.
22. The expert must be better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the facts
presented to him. Thus, reliability here means accuracy and not necessarily trustworthiness, al-
though professional ethics and credibility arguments can enter the qualification proceeding to
assure an initial level of trustworthiness. See D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 132, at 424-28.
23. The term "secondary reliability" was chosen because the court makes two findings. The
first is the routine qualification proceeding undertaken by the trial judge. "To be an expert...
[i]t is enough that, through study or experience, or both, he has acquired such skill that he is better
qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the particular subject." 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note
2, § 133, at 429.
Once so qualified, the expert is then considered in terms of his relationship with the subject
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The traditional rule governing the acceptable basis for expert testi-
mony allows opinion founded on personal knowledge or facts
presented in a hypothetical question. 4 As the scope and content of
expert testimony have grown, however, courts have been faced with
increasingly difficult evidentiary questions regarding the proper foun-
dation for expert opinion. Deviations from the general rule have often
been mandated by the regular reliance of experts in the field on non-
conforming sources of information or by the need to admit an opinion
that, although formulated under circumstances that are technically vio-
lative of the rule, would be useful in the resolution of the issue before
the trier of fact.25 In addition, the supreme court has created excep-
tions to the rule when the circumstances under which an opinion is
formed render the opinion sufficiently reliable.2 6 The court's applica-
matter of his testimony. This examination, also undertaken by the trial judge, is the secondary
reliability test. See notes 87-90 infra.
24. See authorities cited in note 2 supra.
25. North Carolina cases that have focused on the problems of expert testimony based on
hearsay have dealt most often with three subjects: the psychiatrist's opinion of a criminal defend-
ant's sanity, the physician's opinion regarding the extent of a patient's disability in a personal
injury action, and the appraiser's opinion of the value of real estate in a condemnation proceed-
ing. Eg., Cogdill v. Highway Comm., 279 N.C. 313, 182 S.E.2d 373 (1971) (condemnation pro-
ceeding); Penland v. Coal Co., 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957) (physician's opinion in worker
compensation proceeding); State v. Alexander, 179 N.C. 759, 103 S.E.383 (1920) (psychiatric opin-
ion).
Psychiatric and other medical professionals rely to a great extent on hearsay sources in their
practice. The trial judge in Wade, for example, recognized that a psychiatrist's opinion as to the
sanity of a defendant necessarily requires conversations with the accused:
[Tihe cases which deal with this subject certainly leave something to be desired as far as
clarity is concerned. I take the view and I'm going to rule that this witness may give his
opinion despite the fact that it is largely based upon statements which were made to him
by the defendant. The Court's position being that in no other way I can think of can a
psychiatrist go about his business. If he's required to observe objective symptoms and
leave out any subjective findings based upon what that man has said, I cannot see how
he can perform any useful function so far as the Court is concerned.
Record at 49.
On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that conversation between a psy-
chiatrist and a defendant is essential to an understanding by the former of the latter's state of
mind:
Conversation, and its interpretation and analysis by a trained professional, is undoubt-
edly superior to any other method the courts have for gaining access to an allegedly
insane defendant's mind. When it is conducted with the professional safeguards present
here, it provides a sufficient basis for the introduction of an expert diagnosis into evi-
dence.
296 N.C. at 463, 251 S.E.2d at 412; see also State v. DeGregory, 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794
(1974). In DeGregory, the court stated that a psychiatrist may base an expert opinion on the
defendant's sanity "upon both his own personal examination and other information contained in
the patient's official hospital record." Id. at 134, 203 S.E.2d at 802.
26. See authorities cited at notes 27-77 infra. The traditional explanation for the restriction
against admission of hearsay-based expert opinion "seems to be that the jury is asked to accept as
evidence the witness' inference, based upon someone's hearsay assertion of a fact which is, pre-
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tion of this secondary reliability test has been inconsistent, however,
causing confusion and inefficiency at the trial court level.
The 1920 case of State v. Alexander27 was the first to employ a
secondary reliability test. There, defendant offered psychiatric testi-
mony corroborating his insanity defense to a homicide charge.2  The
psychiatrist testified that defendant was insane and that his conclusion
was based on conversations he had had with defendant subsequent to
the crime.29 Testimony on the substance of these conversations, how-
ever, was barred.3" On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court up-
held the admissibility of the psychiatrist's opinion, despite its partial
hearsay foundation in inadmissible conversations with defendant, be-
cause defendant's assertion of insanity from before the crime to the
time of trial assured the testimony's reliability.3I The court reasoned
that statements made during examinations subsequent to the crime,
and the meaning of these statements, were a reliable indicator of de-
fendant's condition at the time of the crime.3 2
sumably, not supported by any evidence at the trial and which therefore the jury has no basis for
finding true." C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 15, at 34 (2d ed. 1972)
The court in Wade responded to this problem with the argument that once an opinion based
on inadmissible substantive evidence is admitted "the expert may testify to the information relied
on in forming it for the purpose of showing the basis of the opinion." 296 N.C. at 462, 251 S.E.2d
at 412.
The demarcation between hearsay and personal knowledge is often very obscure. See C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 253, at 608-13. The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c). An opinion based on
hearsay is theoretically unacceptable because it uses the evidence substantively to form the basis
of the testimony without having that foundation subjected to oath or cross-examination.
Several classes of information are considered to be exceptions to the general hearsay exclu-
sion rule. Rule 803 lists twenty four exceptions to the rule when the declarant is available, such as
present sense impressions, FED. R. EvID. 803(1), and statements for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment. FED. R. EVID. 803(4). Rule 804 lists five categories of applicable exceptions when
the declarant is unavailable. FED. R. EVID. 804(l)-(5). North Carolina has a more limited set of
exceptions that generally apply only when the declarant is unavailable and the declaration is
"more than ordinarily trustworthy." 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 144, at 479. See also id.
§ 144-65, at 478-561.
27. 179 N.C. 759, 103 S.E. 383 (1920).
28. Id. at 765, 103 S.E. at 386.
29. Id. at 765-66, 103 S.E. at 386-87.
30. Id. at 765, 103 S.E. at 386; see State v. Wade, 296 N.C. at 459, 251 S.E. 2d at 410 (discus-
sion of the limited appeal in Alexander).
31. Id. at 766, 103 S.E. at 386.
32. Id. (quoting People v. Nino, 149 N.Y. 317 (1896)):
The examination of the experts was directed to his mental condition at the time they saw
him; and from the conclusion they then reached, and the medical and other facts proved,
they would be competent to give, on the trial, an opinion as to his sanity or insanity at
the time of the homicide.
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In Penland v. Coal Co. , the court identified another element as-
suring the reliability of a medical opinion derived from a patient's out-
of-court statements. 4 During plaintiffs hearing for workers' compen-
sation benefits, a medical expert testified that plaintiff sought treatment
from him for a persistent chest ailment. 5 As part of the diagnostic
stage of treatment, plaintiff told the physician about his on-the-job ac-
cident.3 6 Upon finding no other physically observable cause of plain-
tiff's disability, the doctor concluded that "based on subjective
statements made by the claimant" the accident caused plaintiff to lose
twenty-five per cent of his ability to perform his job. 7 In upholding
admission of the doctor's opinion, the supreme court focused on the
expert's position as a treating physician, and reasoned that a patient
will be deterred from making false or self-serving statements if subse-
quent treatment is based on the statements.33
Although the Penland and Alexander courts allowed admission of
certain opinions derived from a patient's out-of-court statements, the
next series of decisions barred expert opinion based in part on the state-
ments of others. In Seawell v. Brame,39 the doctor who had treated
plaintiff after an on-the-job accident testified in a workers' compensa-
tion hearing that the accident caused plaintiffs ailment. 40 The doctor
explained that this conclusion, from which he charted a course of treat-
ment, was based on conversations with plaintiff as well as with plain-
tiff's family and a fellow employee.4' In barring admission of the
opinion and its basis, the supreme court found that the third-party
communications to the doctor, in which the parties indicated that
before the accident plaintiff had never suffered symptoms similar to the
ones complained of at the hearing, were not sufficiently reliable to sup-
33. 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
34. Id. at 30-31, 97 S.E.2d at 435-36.
35. Id. at 29, 97 S.E.2d at 434-35.
36. Id. at 29-30, 97 S.E.2d at 435.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 31, 97 S.E.2d at 436. The court admitted both the physician's opinion and the
foundation supporting the diagnosis because the physician had treated plaintiff:
[Tihe rule is that ordinarily the opinion of a physician is not rendered inadmissible by
the fact that it is based wholly or in part on statements made to him by the patient, if
those statements are made, as in the instant case, in the course of professional treatment
and with a view of effecting a cure, or during an examination made for the purpose of
treatment and cure.
Id.
39. 258 N.C. 666, 129 S.E.2d 283 (1963).
40. Id. at 669-70, 129 S.E.2d at 286.
41. Id. at 669, 129 S.E.2d at 286.
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port the expert's opinion.42
Without mentioning Penland, the court reverted to the traditional
rule of State v. David: "[An expert] may express his opinion as to the
cause of the physical condition of a person if his opinion is based either
upon facts within his personal knowledge, or upon an assumed state of
facts supported by evidence and recited in a hypothetical question. 43
Although both Penland and Seawell involved treating physicians, the
two cases are distinguishable in that the source of the physician's infor-
mation in the latter case came in part from parties who did not have a
direct stake in assuring proper treatment.44
Two years after Seawell, in Ingram v. McCuiston,45 the court
barred an expert opinion based on another type of hearsay-the opin-
ion of another expert.46 At the trial of a personal injury action, plain-
tiff's medical expert testified, in response to a hypothetical question,
that in his opinion plaintiff was suffering from a permanent physical
and neurotic disorder.47 The witness had referred plaintiff to a psychi-
atrist for an assessment of her mental condition. 48 While the psychia-
trist had not yet testified to his diagnosis that plaintiff was suffering an
extremely depressive reaction to the accident, the hypothetical assumed
as a fact the psychiatric diagnosis.49 On appeal the supreme court
found the reliance on the diagnosis of the psychiatrist fatal to the ad-
mission of the physician's expert opinion. Adopting the rule laid down
in a Maryland court of appeals case decided thirty years earlier, 0 the
42. Id. at 671, 129 S.E.2d at 287-88.
43. Id. at 671, 129 S.E.2d at 287 (quoting Spivey v. Newman, 232 N.C. 281, 284, 59 S.E.2d
844, 847 (1950)).
44. 258 N.C. at 671, 129 S.E.2d at 287-88. Third-party statements made to treating physi-
cians are not considered reliable because the outside parties have no vested interest in getting
proper treatment.
45. 261 N.C. 392, 134 S.E.2d 705 (1964).
46. Id. at 401, 134 S.E.2d at 711-12.
47. Id. at 394-99, 134 S.E.2d at 707-10.
48. Id. at 401, 134 S.E.2d at 711.
49. Id.
50. Although a medical expert may base his opinion upon the facts testified to by an-
other expert, the witness may not have submitted to him, as part of the facts to be consid-
ered in the formation of his inference and conclusion, the opinion of such other expert on
all or some of the facts to be considered by the witness from whom the answer is sought.
To do so would destroy the premises of fact upon which an expert, by reason of his own
peculiar technical skill and knowledge, is permitted to give in evidence his own inference
and opinion.
Id. at 401, 134 S.E.2d at 712 (quoting Quimby v. Greenhawk, 166 Md. 335, 340, 171 A. 59, 61
(1934) (emphasis added).
In Quimby contradictory opinion testimony as to the mental capacity of testator had already
been introduced and formed part of the basis for subsequent opinion on the same issue. The
supreme court's adoption of that rule in McCuiston is misplaced because the physician had, in his
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court held that an expert cannot base his opinion "upon the opinions,
inferences, or conclusions of other witnesses. . . unless their testimony
is put to him hypothetically as an assumed fact."'"
In Todd v. Watts 52 the court demonstrated even more clearly its
confusion over the admissibility of expert testimony based on hearsay.
Like Penland, Todd involved statements made by the patient to the
physician. 3 The physician who treated plaintiff for injuries resulting
from an auto accident testified in a subsequent personal injury action to
the permanency and cause of plaintiff's continuing pain.54 His conclu-
sions were based in part on conversations he had had with plaintiff
during which they discussed specifics of the accident. On appeal of
an award to plaintiff, the supreme court, per Justice Sharp, ignored
Penland, however, and held that it was error to allow the physician to
give his opinion because he "had no personal knowledge that plaintiff
was involved in an automobile accident . . . or, if she was, that she
sustained any injuries."56 In dissent, Chief Justice Parker relied on
Penland to point out that the testimony was "competent and properly
treatment, relied on the psychiatrist's opinion and, to literally apply the Maryland rule would
effectively bar the opinion testimony of a medical expert who relied on the diagnoses of colleagues
to aid in his treatment of a patient.
The problem of opinion based on opinion is closely related to that of opinion based on hear-
say. Under the rule set forth in MeCuiston, an expert testifying in response to a hypothetical
question will never be allowed to rely on the diagnoses of other physicians that are based on the
same physical or mental conditions, even though such corroborating opinion formed a basis for
subsequent treatment. This rule artificially and unnecessarily distinguishes between the profes-
sional routine and the courtroom.
Although this seems to be the majority rule, see C. McCoRMICK, supra note 26, § 15, at 34-
35, n.99, there are several decisions to the contrary, id § 15, at 35 n.2, and the majority rule has
been criticized:
If the statements [diagnoses or record of examination by another physician, hospital
charts, records of symptoms and treatment]. . . are attested to by the expert as the basis
for a judgment upon which he would act in the practice of his profession, it seems that
they should ordinarily be a sufficient basis even standing alone for his direct expression
of professional opinion on the stand, and this argument is reinforced when the opinion is
founded not only upon reports but also in part upon the expert's first hand observation,
The data of observation will usually enable the expert to evaluate the reliability of the
statement.
Id. § 15, at 36.
51. 261 N.C. at 401, 134 S.E.2d at 712 (citing State v. David, 222 N.C. 242, 22 S.E.2d 633
(1942)).
52. 269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967).
53. See D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 136, at 447 n.71 ("It is possible to distinguish [Todd]
...from Penland v. Coal Co. . .though on highly technical grounds. It is also possible to inter-
pret the Todd decision as overruling Penland."); Note, Evidence-Expert Testimony-Physican's
Opinion Based on Patient's Statements, 46 N.C.L. REv. 960 (1968).
54. 269 N.C. at 419-21, 152 S.E.2d at 450-51.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 420, 152 S.E.2d at 451 (citing Spivey v. Newman, 232 N.C. 281,284, 59 S.E.2d 844,
847 (1950); Robbins v. Trading Post, Inc., 251 N.C. 663, 111 S.E.2d 884 (1960)).
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admitted."57 In addition, he noted that the majority's decision was im-
practical "because a doctor customarily relies upon such statements
made to him by a patient in the practice of his profession."58
The recognition that an expert must be allowed to base an opinion
on information derived by practices normally used in his profession led
the court, in its 1974 decision in State v. DeGregory,59 to resurrect the
Penland rule. DeGregory arose from defendant's conviction on a mur-
der charge. Prior to trial the court had confined defendant to a state
mental hospital for an assessment of his mental condition.6" At trial
the state called a psychiatrist who had examined defendant and asked
whether he had an opinion on defendant's mental capacity at the time
of the crime based on interviews with defendant and facts and data
contained in the hospital record.6' Over defense counsel's objections,
the trial court admitted the opinion that defendant was not insane.62
On appeal the supreme court afTmed.63 The court, however, carefully
avoided mention of Penland and instead expanded the interpretation of
the personal knowledge rule: "[The traditional rule] does not purport
to limit facts and information within the personal knowledge of an ex-
pert to knowledge derived so/ely from matters personally observed. As
demonstrated in opinions of this Court since State v. David . . . an
expert has wide latitude in gathering information and may base his
opinion on evidence not otherwise admissible."'  This ruling, which
virtually eliminated the previous North Carolina bar against a hearsay
foundation for an expert's opinion,65 was completely at odds with Jus-
57. Id. at 422, 152 S.E.2d at 452 (Parker, C.J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 422-23, 152 S.E.2d at 452. In Todd, the court was faced with a fact situation in
which the physician was presumptively reliable as a qualified expert in his field and the secondary
reliability test seemingly had been met because plaintiffs declarations took place within a bona
fide patient-physician relationship with an expectation of treatment and cure.
59. 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974).
60. Id. at 128, 203 S.E.2d at 799.
61. Id. at 131, 203 S.E.2d at 800. The expert was asked: "Based upon your own personal
examination and interview of Earl DeGregory, and any other information contained in his official
record of which you were the custodian and had available to you, did you make a diagnosis of the
defendant?" Id. (emphasis in original).
62. 1d. at 130-31, 203 S.E.2d at 799.
63. Id. at 135, 203 S.E.2d at 803.
64. Id. at 132, 203 S.E.2d at 801 (emphasis in original).
65. See 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 136, at 447:
Originally ... a physician was not allowed to express an opinion based upon statements
made to him by his patient. It was then apparently held that the opinion of a medical
expert is not rendered inadmissible because it is based wholly or in part on the "case
history" as related by the patient for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment. But the
latest [as of 1973] decision seems, unfortunately, to revert to the former rule, though it
may not be wholly definitive.
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tice Sharp's refusal in Todd to allow a treating physician to assume that
an injured patient had been in an auto accident because he had no
personal knowledge that such an accident had actually occurred. 66
In allowing an expert to base an opinion on information compiled
by other doctors as well as statements of defendant, the supreme court
in DeGregory went even further than Penland had gone. 67 The court,
however, limited its reasoning to the idea that experts should be able to
employ normal medical practices and failed to find any secondary reli-
ability in the hearsay evidence. 61 Unlike Penland there was no doctor-
patient relationship with an expectation of treatment and cure to sup-
port reliability. Nor was the length of time defendant had asserted in-
sanity or the duration of the expert's examination a factor in the court's
decision. In fact, the expert's testimony was based on an examination
performed in preparation for testimony at trial. 9
Id. See also; Annot., 55 A.L.R.3rd 551 (197 1) (admissibility on issue of sanity of expert opinion
based partly on medical, psychological, or hospital reports).
66. See note 54 supra; I D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 136, at 249-50 (Cum. Supp. 1979);
Note, Expert Medical Opinion Evidence in North Carolina: In Search of a Controlliqg Precedent, 8
N.C. CENT. L.J. 267, 284-86 (1977).
67. The DeGregory court allowed an expert to base his opinion on the patient's statements as
well as on hospital records. This extension of the Penland rule and its application to non-treating
psychiatrists constituted a major expansion of the allowable hearsay bases for expert testimony,
Citing Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965), to justify
this expansion, the DeGregory court stated:
Judge Friendly, writing for the court, first noted that prior decisions had established that
opinions as to sanity contained in hospital records are not admissible under the Business
Records Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732, but that such an opinion is admissible in evidence if the
expert rendering it is made available for cross-examination.
285 N.C. 122, 133, 203 S.E.2d 794, 802 (1974). But see I D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 136, at
250 n.71 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
68. The reliability problems that have been focused upon by the court in similar situations
were seemingly ignored here. Pen/and suggested that opinions of non-treating physicians were
unreliable and McCuiston seemed to say that opinions based on the diagnoses of colleagues were
suspect. In DeGregory, these considerations were subsumed in Justice Huskins' expansion of the
personal knowledge rule, but that rule was also confused with the idea of allowing hearsay-based
opinion if that was the normal professional practice in the expert's field. Applying a rule created
for eminent domain proceedings the court stated:
An integral part of an expert's work is to obtain all possible information, data, detail,
and material which will aid him in arriving at an opinion. Much of the source material
will be in and of itself inadmissible evidence but that fact does not preclude him from
using it in arriving at an opinion. All of the factors he has gained are weighed and given
the sanction of his experience in his expressing an opinion. It is proper for the expert
when called as a witness to detail the facts upon which his conclusion or opinion is based
and this is true even though his opinion is based entirely on knowledge gained from
inadmissible sources.
285 N.C. at 133, 203 S.E.2d at 802 (quoting People v. Gangi Corp., 15 Cal. Rptr. 19, 25 (Ct. App.
1961), rev'dsub nom on other grounds, 57 Cal.2d 346, 19 Cal. Rptr. 473, 369 P.2d 1 (1962).
69. 285 N.C. at 122, 203 S.E.2d at 794. The psychiatrist testified for the State as a rebuttal
witness to defendant's assertion of insanity: "[Diefendant . . . was admitted under court order for
observation and evaluation and spent approximately sixty days in the hospital." .d. at 128, 203
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In 1975 Chief Justice Sharp took the opportunity presented in a
dispute over the admissibility of psychiatric expert testimony in a
homicide case to attempt a reconciliation of Todd and Penland in light
of DeGregory. In State v. Block,"° a psychiatrist had examined defend-
ant for two hours in a sheriffs office two days before the commence-
ment of trial in preparation as an expert witness for defendant.7 1 At
trial, the expert testified on voir dire that defendant had told him of a
number of incidents from his past, that he had conversed with defend-
ant's family and friends, and that on this basis he believed that the
accused was pathologically intoxicated on the night of the murder.72
The jury returned, and the trial judge sustained the state's objection to
the introduction of the expert's opinion.73
The North Carolina Supreme Court resurrected the Todd rule re-
quiring personal knowledge or a properly based hypothetical ques-
tion,7 4 and cited Penland for the proposition that hearsay is a proper
basis for an expert medical opinion only when there is "professional
treatment. . . with a view of effecting a cure."' 75 Because the psychia-
trist's only relationship with defendant in Bock was for the purpose of
forming an opinion to deliver at trial, the supreme court agreed with
the conclusion of the trial court that the psychiatrist's opinion should
not be admitted.76
The history of the supreme court's efforts prior to Wade to resolve
the tension between the trustworthiness of information relied on by an
expert in his professional routine and the more restrictive reliability
S.E.2d at 799. The expert stated: "Personally, I spent about three hours with [defendant] ...
My testimony is predicated on the three hours which I spent with [defendant] and upon theinfor-
mation furnished me by members of my staff." Id. at 131, 203 S.E.2d at 800-01.
70. 288 NC. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975), affid in part, vacated in part, 428 U.S. 903 (1976)
(mem.).
71. Id. at 153, 217 S.E.2d at 518.
72. Id. at 153-54, 217 S.E.2d at 518-19.
73. Id. at 154, 217 S.E.2d at 519.
74. Id. at 162, 217 S.E.2d at 524.
75. Id.
76. Id. The court cited Penland approvingly for the proposition that "[tihe opinion of a
physician ... is not ordinarily rendered inadmissible by the fact that it is based wholly or in part
on statements made to him by the patient, if those statements are made in the course ofprofessional
treatment and with a view of effecting a cure, or during an examination made for the purpose of
treatment and cure." Id. at 163, 217 S.E.2d at 524 (emphasis in original). Finding that "[t]he
motive which ordinarily prompts a patient to tell his physician the truth is absent here," the Bock
court therefore held the psychiatrist's opinion properly excluded. The court, however, ignored
DeGregory and McCuiston and failed to examine other possible bases for meeting the secondary
reliability test such as the length of the psychiatrist's exposure to defendant and the length of time
that defendant had asserted his insanity.
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requirements of the rules of evidence 7 is one of inconsistency and con-
fusion.78 Indeed, prior to Wade, Professor Brandis noted: "Since no
case has been overruled and no thorough judicial attempt to reconcile
these various decisions has been made . . . there is at hand a conve-
nient precedent for the next decision, whatever its tenor may be." 79
The opinion in Wade was ostensibly an attempt to reconcile the discord
of past cases and to lay down a rule that could be applied universally to
expert opinion.8 ° In fact, the broadest interpretation of Wade would
permit the admission of an expert opinion based in part on hearsay
whenever it meets the standards of the secondary reliability test. The
Wade court itself, however, seems to have restricted the significance of
its decision through its haphazard reliance on prior cases and the ap-
77. Indeed, a balance between the trustworthiness of information that experts normally rely
on and the rules of evidence is difficult to achieve, particularly in light of the differing standards of
reliability that often exist even within an expert's profession. See McElhaney, Expert Witnesses
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MERCER L. Rav. 463 (1977).
But the standards of reliability in any particular field must take into account the special
situation in which it arises. A medical doctor making an emergency diagnosis at the
scene of an accident will not use the same standards of reliability as he did in the re-
search laboratory he left just before starting home. Trials are supposed to provide an
opportunity for calm deliberation, appropriately taking longer to review events than the
events themselves may have taken to transpire. The standard of reasonableness that the
judge should apply is the judicial one, looking at the expert's field for guidance but not
for ultimate decision.
Id. at 486.
78. The various secondary reliability tests which have evolved from past cases do not address
the general problem that many experts must rely on hearsay in forming a meaningful opinion
regardless of their relationship to the subject matter of the testimony. See Rheingold, The Basis of
Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1962). The subsections of the Rheingold article are an
excellent catalogue of the information commonly relied on by medical experts in forming opin-
ions: education, training, and subsequent learning; experience; medical books and periodicals;
scientific principles and facts, general medical knowledge, statistical information, and methodolo-
gies of tests; personal observation; tests and investigations; body movements; prior acquaintance;
second hand knowledge from patients, relatives, lay observers, other doctors, nurses and techni-
cians; results of tests performed or interpreted by others; hospital records; legal sources; observa-
tion at trial; prior testimony of witnesses; and hypothetical assumptions.
Even a hurried survey of the various bases indicates that hearsay in one form or another
pervades all of medical testimony, just as it pervades the whole medical routine and
practice. And by the very exclusion of material deemed hearsay, often as the result of
rather legalistic, technical reasoning, much that is of value to the doctor in his practice
and to the court in the determination of the medical facts of the case is lost.
Id. at 527. See also 2 J. WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 665(b), at 784-85 (3d ed. 1940); Comment, The
Physician's Testimony-Hearsay Evidence or Expert Opinion.- A Question of Professional Compe-
tence. 53 TEx. L. REv. 296 (1975).
No professional man can know from personal observation more than a minute fraction
of the data which he must every day treat as working truths. Hence a reliance on the
reported data offellow scientists, learned by perusing their reports in books and journals.
The law must and does accept this kind of knowledge from scientific men.
2 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 665(b), at 784 (emphasis in original).
79. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 136, at 250 n.71 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
80. See State v. Wade, 296 N.C. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
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parent limitation of its discussion to the hearsay-based opinion of medi-
cal experts. Moreover, by failing to expressly overrule any of these
prior cases, despite their inconsistency among themselves and with
Wade, the Wade court falls short of eliminating the confusion of the
past sixty years.
Perhaps the only rule that can assuredly be gleaned from Wade is
that a medical expert may base an opinion on conversations with the
patient"' and on the reports of other medical experts8 2 if there is "suffi-
cient indication of the reliability of [the patient's] statements in the na-
ture of [the expert's] entire examination."8 3 If the expert testifying is a
treating physician, then, under the rationale of prior cases,84 the pa-
tient's statements during the treatment stage are likely to be sufficiently
reliable for the expert to base an opinion on them. Because Justice
Exum cited DeGregory with approval, it is possible that even a non-
treating doctor can testify to an opinion based on the patient's state-
ments, particularly if the doctor's examination was thorough. With
the exception of the reports of other medical expert's, however, third-
party communications remain an unacceptable basis under the secon-
dary reliability test because the declarants do not have a substantial
vested interest in the accuracy of their statements.8 6
81. This portion of the rule is within the facts of Wade.
82. The McCuiston decision, barring a physician's opinion based on another physician's di-
agnosis, has apparently been overruled sub silentio by the Wade court's dictum: "[T]he physician
making a diagnosis must necessarily rely on many observations and tests performed by others and
recorded by them." 296 N.C. at 461-62, 251 S.E.2d at 411 (quoting Birdsell v. United States, 346
F.2d 775, 779-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965)). Of course, the information supplied
by other experts is subject to the same hearsay requirements to which the opinion of the testifying
expert is subject.
83. 296 N.C. at 463, 251 S.E.2d at 412. Justice Exum maintained the traditional rule requir-
ing personal knowledge by expanding the definition of personal knowledge to include a patient's
statements and other doctors' reports. 296 N.C. at 461, 251 S.E.2d at 411. He failed to mention,
however, Todd v. Watts, 269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967), in which Justice Sharp specifically
rejected an expansion of the personal knowledge definition. Id. at 420-21, 152 S.E.2d at 451.
84. See, e.g., Penland v. Coal Co., 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
85. In DeGregory, a nontreating physician was allowed to give an opinion based on defend-
ant's personal statements and information contained in hospital records. Although a person may
not necessarily give accurate statements to a doctor who examines him solely in preparation to
testify, the doctor may be able to judge the reliability of the statements through a thorough exami-
nation and through comparing his opinion with the opinion of other experts.
The Wade court referred to Bock to support barring testimony of a psychiatrist who had seen
defendant only two hours in preparing to testify, 296 N.C. at 460-61, 251 S.E.2d at 411. The only
apparent distinction between DeGregory and Bock is that the examination in DeGregory was
more encompassing. See 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 136, at 250 n.71 (Cum. Supp. 1979);
Note, Expert Medical Opinion Evidence in North Carolina: In Search of a Controlling Precedent, 8
N.C. CENT. L.J. 267, 278-86 (1977).
86. 296 N.C. at 460-61, 251 S.E.2d at 411. The court cited Seawell with approval. The
court's belief that third party communications are not sufficiently reliable, however, is suspect. A
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The range of experts to which the relaxed requirements of Wade
will apply is also not readily apparent. Although the expert testifying
in Wade was a psychiatrist, the language in the opinion" and its ra-
tionale88 suggest that Wade extends to other medical experts as well.
Whether or not experts outside of the medical field now enjoy the re-
laxed hearsay requirements of Wade is unclear. Perhaps the answer
depends on whether the expert must necessarily rely on his client's
statements or on information supplied by other experts in his normal
professional routine. 9
The use of the hypothetical question as the preferred means of
eliciting expert testimony based on matters outside of the witness's per-
sonal knowledge is also in doubt after Wade. The Wade court held
that once an expert opinion is found to meei the secondary reliability
test and is, therefore, admissible, the information on which it is based is
also admissible.9 0 The hearsay foundation for an expert opinion, re-
gardless of its reliability, cannot technically be included in a hypotheti-
cal question, however, because it is not a fact in evidence "or such as
the jury will be justified in inferring from the evidence."9" Therefore,
the foundation must be elicited on direct examination subsequent to
the expert's testimony on the opinion itself. Whether this means that
the hypothetical question in regard to the facts and assumed inferences
already in evidence, and the subsequent examination of the expert for
the reliable hearsay portion of the basis, will be used in combination to
support expert opinion is not clear. It is reasonable to infer from
member of a patient's family, for example, would have the same vested interest that the patient
has in making sure that information about the patient given to the physician is accurate enough
for the physician to base treatment on it.
87. The court refers in its holding to "a physician." 296 N.C. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
88. Medical experts other than psychiatrists must rely on their patients' statements as well as
opinions of other doctors in their everyday practice.
89. Wade provides minimal guidance for the trial judge in his determination of inherent
reliability. He is advised to look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the expert-sub-
ject relationship, the specific qualifications of the expert, and the typical practice in the expert's
field. In many cases-for example, an economist's opinion on damages in a wrongful death ac-
tion-he will have no better idea than the average layman as to what is inherently reliable. Per-
haps the better rule is to let the opinion in and hope that the qualification process has rid the court
of quacks and liars, and that the exposure of the foundation to the jurors is clear enough to allow
them to decide for themselves what is reliable.
90. 296 N.C. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
91. I D. STANsBURY, supra note 2, § 137, at 452. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 14, at
31-34; McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MERCER L. REv. 463,
471-74 (1977); Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473, 522-26 (1962).
In fact, because the hearsay foundation for an expert opinion "is not independently admissible
into evidence," 296 N.C. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412, it could not possibly be introduced into evi-
dence prior to the expert's testimony.
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Wade, however, that once an expert's opinion is determined to be ad-
missible under the secondary reliability test, it need not bepreceded by
the examining attorney's elucidation of its basis in the form of the cum-
bersome hypothetical question. This result is laudable because in prac-
tice the hypothetical question has been confusing to both the witness
and jury, often leads to opinions not actually intended, is unnecessarily
time consuming, and is subject to the abuses of manipulative practi-
tioners.92 Its replacement by direct examination of the expert as the
tool in presenting the foundation for an expert opinion to the jury will
aid the fact-finding process. 93
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide much more leeway for the
admission of expert opinion than even Wade's relaxation of the re-
quirements in North Carolina will permit. The federal trial courts are
not asked to apply the secondary reliability test; they instead defer to
the presumption of reliability inherent in professional standards of
practice.94 As a result, the basis for an expert opinion is rarely the
reason for its exclusion from evidence.95 Under this system the hypo-
thetical question becomes obsolete, except for its obvious tactical ad-
92. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 78, § 686, at 812.
The hypothetical question, misused by the clumsy and abused by the clever, has in prac-
tice led to intolerable obstruction of truth. In the first place, it has artificially clamped
the mouth of the expert witness, so that his answer to a complex question may not ex-
press his actual opinion on the actual case. This is because the question may be so built
up and contrived by counsel as to represent only a partisan conclusion. In the second
place, it has tended to mislead the jury as to the purport of actual expert opinion. This is
due to the same reason. In the third place, it has tended to confuse the jury, so that its
employment becomes a mere waste of time and futile obstruction.
Id. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 16, at 36.
93. The Wade court cited State v. Griffin, 99 Ariz. 43, 406 P.2d 397 (1965), for the proposi-
tion that the jury is entitled to hear the foundation for the psychiatric opinion:
[T]o allow a psychiatrist as an expert witness to answer without any explanation...
would impart a meaningless conclusion to the jury. The jury must be given an opportu-
nity to evaluate the expert's conclusion by his testimony as to what matters he took into
consideration to reach it. Therefore the psychiatrist should be allowed to relate what
matters he necessarily considered as a 'case history' not as to indicate the ultimate truth
thereof, but as one of the bases for reaching his conclusion, according to accepted medi-
cal practice. The court should therefore exercise care in the manner in which such testi-
mony is elicited, so that the jury may understand that the case history does not constitute
factual evidence, unless corroborated by other competent evidence.
296 N.C. at 463-64, 251 S.E.2d at 412 (quoting State v. Griffin, 99 Ariz. at 49, 406 P.2d at 401).
94. See United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 845 (1975).
The rationale in favor of the admissibility of expert testimony based on hearsay is that
the expert is fully capable of judging for himself what is, or is not, a reliable basis for his
opinion. This relates directly to one of the functions of the expert witness, namely to
lend his special expertise to the issue before him. In so doing, various experts customa-
rily rely on evidence not independently admissible in the courtroom.
Id. at 149.
95. For a discussion of the reliability requirements used under FED. R. EvID. 703, see note 99
infra.
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vantages in certain situations, since opinions are no longer inadmissible
merely because they are based on hearsay.96
Rather than bogging down trials with often unwieldy hypothetical
questions or appeal-provoking decisions on secondary reliability, Rule
70397 allows the introduction of expert opinion based on the "presenta-
tion of data to the expert outside of court and other than by his own
perception"98 if the foundation for the opinion is "of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject."99 In addition, the federal rules do not
require that the foundation always be presented to the jury. 0 0 The
rationale of the drafters in extending the scope of expert testimony was
that judicial practice should be brought into conformity with the pro-
fessional standards of experts outside of court.101 As the United States
96. See I1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 703.10 (2d ed. 1976).
97. FED. R. EvID. 703.
98. FED. R. EVID. 703, Advisory Committee's Note; see 11 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 703.01 (2d ed. 1976).
99. FED. R. EvID. 703. In one sense the Federal Rules do have a secondary reliability test.
The trial judge must determine what is reasonably relied on in a particular field. Such determina-
tions, however, are easier to make than those based on the specific secondary reliability test re-
quired by Wade. The reasoning underlying the Federal Rules is that allowing the expert to base
his opinion on hearsay will permit the fact-finding process of the trial to proceed on the same
reliability level as the fact-finding process within the expert's profession. As the drafters warn,
however, some sources used by "professionals" cannot be admitted as reasonably relied upon.
For example, "[tihe language would not warrant admitting in evidence the opinion of an 'ac-
cidentologist' as to the point of impact in an automobile collision based on statements of bystand-
ers." Id., Advisory Committee's Note; see McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 28 MERCER L. REv. 463, 483-87 (1977).
100. The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires other-
wise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on
cross examination.
FED. R. EvID. 705. Under the rule, the trial court can in its discretion require preliminary disclo-
sure of the basis of the expert's opinion through use of a hypothetical question. Id.
101. FED. R. EVID. 703, Advisory Committee's Note. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26,
§ 15; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 78, § 686, at 812-13. The Rules also specifically allow admission
of a patient's declarations to a physician as substantive evidence under an exception to the hearsay
rule. FED. R. EViD. 803(4). This exception includes "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sen-
sations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." Id. Moreover, this exception is not restricted to
statements made to the treating physician. See id., Advisory Committee's Note; 11 MooRE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE § 803(4) [5] (2d ed. 1976):
The statements need not be made to a physician. For purposes of the rule, statements to
nurses, ambulance drivers, other medical attendants, or even third persons are admissi-
ble, so long as they are "reasonably pertinent" to diagnosis or treatment ...
[SItatements made after diagnosis or treatment would be irrelevant and inadmissible
hearsay.
Id. See id § 803(4)[4]; McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MER-
CER L. REv. 463, 490-92 (1977). The Rules do not further distinguish between statements made to
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has noted: "Years of experience
teach the expert to separate the wheat from the chaff and to use only
those sources and kinds of information which are of a type reasonably
relied upon by similar experts in arriving at sound opinions on the sub-
ject."10 2
The continued resistance to the federal approach in North Caro-
lina is based on a legitimate concern with ensuring the trustworthiness
of testimony at trial.'03 Indeed, under the Federal Rules, some biased
and self-serving information may filter through the expert's profes-
sional sieve. The cost of excluding some opinions because they fail to
satisfy a secondary reliability test, however, is far greater than the bene-
fit that such caution bestows on the fact-finding process.'°4 The appli-
a treating physician and to one diagnosing soley in preparation for trial. FED. R. EviD. 803(4).
See id., Advisory Committee's Note:
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not within its guar-
antee of truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted only for the purpose of en-
abling him to testify. . . . IR]ule [803(4)] ...rejects the limitation. This position is
consistent with the provision of Rule 703 that the facts on which expert testimony is
based need not be admissible in evidence if of a kind ordinarily relied upon by experts in
the field.
Id.
102. United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1975).
103. Some argue that the standards of the expert's practice are not reliable enough for the
courtroom. See note 77 supra; Comment, The Physician's Testimony-Hearing Evidence or Expert
Opinion: A Question of Professional Competence, 53 TEx. L. REv. 296, 321-22 (1975). But see
Rheingold, The Basis of /Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REv. 473, 532-34 (1962).
104. This is the general theory behind the approach of the Federal Rules. See note 99 supra.
Two recent comments, however, have strongly criticized the freedom extended to psychiatrists and
psychologists giving opinion testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Comment, The
Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom? 38 MD. L. REV. 539 (1979); Comment,
Hearsay Bases of Psychiatric Opinion Testimony: A Critique of Federal Rule ofEvidence 703, 51 S.
CAL. L. REv. 129 (1978).
The latter comment identifies the two potential sources for unreliable hearsay bases as the
methodology used to collect and analyze the information and the expert's own biases in collecting
and interpreting the data. Psychiatric data, as opposed to physical data, is susceptible to both of
these biases. The reliability that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence assumed to exist in
a professional's diagnostic process may not bear the same weight in the field of psychiatry.
The nature of the opinion testimony required of the testifying psychiatrist. . . may often
preclude the application of the treatment rationale to assess its reliability. Psychiatric
opinions rendered in court often are of no use to a psychiatrist in his practice in develop-
ing a treatment program for a mentally ill patient.
Id. at 148.
The author makes several suggestions intended to increase the usefulness and reliability of
the psychiatric expert's testimony. Courts should make sure that the particular psychiatrist em-
ploys the diagnostic method upon which his testimony is based. The trial court must also make
some assessment of the methodology used by the psychiatrist and determine if it is appropriate to
the situation, accepted in the field and properly implemented. The case study method, which is
standard procedure in most psychiatric examinations, is subject to several abuses. There is no
objective evidence (e.g., x-rays, blood counts, tests) that can be analyzed by others. The expert
must also impart meaning to the subjective behavior and "longitudinal history" of the patient.
For all these reasons the comment suggests that the trial court must be more careful in its use of
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cation of the dual reliability test in North Carolina, as demonstrated by
the line of cases leading up to Wade, has been marred by three persis-
tent drawbacks-decisions on the admissibility of opinions turning on
minor and insignificant variations in the circumstances surrounding the
testimony; an invitation to appeal on previously unaddressed fact situa-
tions; and the application of different rules to virtually indistinguish-
able fact situations. The result is an inconsistent and almost
incomprehensible body of law that can only serve to obfuscate the fact-
finding process.
A better solution to the problem of ensuring the trustworthiness of
expert opinion testimony would be to adopt the deference of the Fed-
eral Rules to the expert's professional expertise yet require, as Wade
does, that the basis for the expert's opinion be exposed to the jury on
direct examination.' 05 Exposure of the Foundation tends to close the
gap between the expert's background and the jury's ignorance by inter-
jecting the practical demand that the testimony meet the common sense
standards of jurors. 1 6 Indeed, jurors are probably as well qualified as
expert psychiatric testimony and its acceptance of the professional safeguards of that profession
than of other medical testimony. Id. at 154-58. One must ask, however, whether the logistical
burden on the court justifies such pre-trial investigation and whether trial court judges have the
available resources to make such inquiries.
105. For a general discussion of the relationship between North Carolina rules governing ex-
pert medical testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Comment, Expert Medical Testi-
mony: Differences Between the North Carolina Rules and Federal Rules of Evidence, 12 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 833 (1976).
Fourteen states have now adopted rules of evidence with provisions identical or similar to
Federal Rules 703 and 705: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., R. EviD. 703; Arkansas, ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 UNIFORM R. EVID. 703; Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN., ME. R. EVID. 703;
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN., EVID. R. 703; Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-3002 R.
EvID. 703; Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-703; Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. § 50.285; New Mexico,
N.M. STAT. ANN. R. EVID. (1978); North Dakota, N.D. R. EVID,, 703; Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12 § 2703; South Dakota, S.D. R. EVID., § 19-15-3; Washington, WASH. R. EvID.; Wis-
consin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 907.03; and Wyoming, Wyo. R. EVID. 703 all adopted rules identical to
Federal Rule 703 without change.
Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., R. EVID. 705; Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 UNI-
FORM R. EVID. 705; Michigan, MICH. R. EVID. 705; Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. EVID. R. 705;
Montana, MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-3002 R. EVID. 705; North Dakota, N.D. R. EVID. 705;
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 705; Washington, WASH. R. EVID., 705; and Wyoming,
Wyo. R. EVID., 705 all adopted rules identical to Federal Rule 705.
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN., EVID. CODE § 90.705; Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN., ME. R.
EvID., 705; Nebraska, NEB. STAT. ANN. § 27-705; New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN., R. EVID. 705;
Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 50.315, 50.325, 50.335; and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. 907.05, each
adopted rules similar to Rule 705.
See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 78, § 686, at 368 (Supp. 1979); 3 J. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
703 [04], at 239, 705 [02], at 255 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
106. See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 78, §§ 672-86; 11 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1705.10
(2d ed. 1976); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 26, § 293, at 692-94.
The task of considering declarations only as an explanation of the basis for an opinion
and not as proof of the truth of those declarations is probably beyond the ability and
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judges to determine if the circumstances under which an expert opinion
is formed render that opinion reliable.
Although Wade purports to depart significantly from the tradi-
tional rule regarding expert testimony, it is not a solution to the logical
inconsistencies that result from use of a dual reliability test. Perhaps
the better rule is to allow all opinions derived by normal professional
practices, ensure that exposure of the foundation to the jury is clear
enough to allow it to determine whether an opinion is reliable, and
hope that the qualification process has rid the court of those who would
base their professional judgments on biased or self-serving statements.
JEROME F. PAGE, III
inclination ofjurors. . If jurors are to be expected reasonably to decide cases involving
medical issues, they must be provided not only with conclusory opinions but with the full
explanation for those opinions.
Id. at 694.
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